IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SPENCER L. MURFEY, III, as

Co-Trustee for the Trust for the

Benefit of Spencer L. Murfey, III,

under the Power of Appointment Trust

of Spencer L. Murfey, Jr., u/a/d

August 1, 2002, and CYNTHIA H. MURFEY:

as Co-Trustee for the Trust for the

Benefit of Cynthia H. Murfey, under

the Power of Appointment Trust of

Spencer L. Murfey, Jr., u/a/d August

1, 2002,

Plaintiffs,

v. : C.A. No.

: 2018-0652-MTZ

WHC VENTURES, LLC, a Delaware : limited liability company, WHC : VENTURE 2009-1, L.P., a Delaware : limited partnership, WHC VENTURES : 2013, L.P., a Delaware limited : partnership, and WHC VENTURES 2016, : L.P., a Delaware limited partnership, :

Defendants.

Chambers
Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
500 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware
Friday, June 21, 2019
3:36 p.m.

BEFORE HON. MORGAN T. ZURN, Vice Chancellor

THE COURT'S BENCH RULING RE PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR BOOKS AND RECORDS

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
500 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
(302) 255-0521

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel.
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    This is Morgan Zurn.
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                    May I have appearances, please?
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                    MR. NEFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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    Carl Neff and Chaney Hall from Fox Rothschild on
 6
    behalf of the plaintiffs.
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                    THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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                    MR. DICAMILLO: Good afternoon, Your
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    Honor. Ray DiCamillo for the defendants. Also on
10
    with me are Brian Morris and Shannon Nakamoto.
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                    THE COURT:
                                 Thank you.
12
                    And Mr. Tumulty has not joined us?
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                    MR. DICAMILLO: I do not believe so.
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                    THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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                    Thanks for getting on the line.
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    Hopefully you're all headed to the beach once we're
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    done here.
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                    This is my post-trial ruling for
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    plaintiffs' request for books and records under
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    Section 17-305 of our Revised Uniform Limited
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    Partnership Act. The defendants are the limited
2.2
    partnerships from whom the books and records are
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    requested. For reasons I will explain, the
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    plaintiffs' request is denied.
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The relevant facts are as follows: 1 2 Spencer L. Murfey, III, is a co-trustee for and a 3 beneficiary of the Trust for the Benefit of Spencer L. 4 Murfey, III, under the Power of Appointment Trust of 5 Spencer L. Murfey, Jr., u/a/d August 1, 2002. 6 Cynthia H. Murfey is a co-trustee for 7 and beneficiary of the Trust for the Benefit of Cynthia H. Murfey, under the Power of Appointment 8 Trust of Spencer L. Murfey, Jr., u/a/d August 1, 2002. 10 I will call those two together the "Trusts." 11 Mr. and Ms. Murfey have served as 12 co-trustees of their respective Trusts since 2015. 13 Others served in that role before that time, including 14 Homer Chisholm, who has served as the co-trustee of 15 each of the Trusts since June 15, 2007. 16 The Trusts are limited partners of 17 each of the defendant partnerships. The trustees 18 executed and delivered subscription applications for 19 investment interests in WHC 2009, one of the 20 defendants. The 2009 application committed \$500,000 21 on behalf of each of the Trusts. 22 In 2011, Chisholm informed plaintiffs 23 of an opportunity to increase the Trusts' investments 24 in WHC 2009, which this opportunity was presented to

all limited partners. Plaintiff directed Mr. Chisholm
to increase the Trusts' investments, and the trustees
subsequently executed and delivered amendments to the
applications dated February 10, 2011. This
increased each of the Trusts' capital commitments to

increased each of the Trusts' capital commitments to \$665,000.

There was a second potential commitment in 2011. As I will explain, the then-trustees did not commit additional capital in the second round. As a result, the plaintiffs experienced some dilution when other limited partners participated in the second round.

The trustees invested in the WHC 2013 and WHC 2016 partnerships as well, but the details of those investments are not relevant to this decision.

WHC Ventures, LLC, is the general partner of the partnerships and a Delaware limited liability company. Peter Nordell, Jr., is the managing member of the general partner. The partnerships are, and have been at all times relevant to plaintiffs' allegations, formed under the laws of Delaware. And substantially all of the limited partners of the partnerships, including plaintiffs' Trusts, are trusts for the benefit of members, or

entities owned by or for the benefit of members, of either the Murfey or Corning families, which are different branches of an extended family.

The Murfey and Corning families have been investing with Greylock Partners since 1965. The Trusts each respectively own an approximate 1.183 percent interest in WHC Ventures 2009. The Trusts each respectively own an approximate 1.178 percent interest in WHC Ventures 2013. And the Trusts each respectively own an approximate 1.178 percent interest in WHC Ventures 2016.

The only entities in which the Trusts invest and which are run by the general partner are the partnerships. Each of the Trusts receives a K-1 from the partnerships each year. The partnership agreements contain a right to inspect the partnerships books and records, which is as follows:

"Each Limited Partner has the right,
on reasonable request and subject to whatever
reasonable standards as the General Partner may from
time to time establish (including standards for
determining whether the purpose for the request is
reasonably related to the Limited Partner's Interest
as a Limited Partner), to obtain from the General

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Partner for purposes reasonably related to the Limited
 1
 2
    Partner's Interest as a Limited Partner the
 3
    information set forth above in Section 12.1 as well as
 4
    information regarding the status of the business and
 5
    financial condition of the Partnership (generally
 6
    consisting of the Partnership's financial statements)
 7
    and whatever other information regarding the affairs
    of the Partnership as is just and reasonable in light
 9
    of the purpose related to the Limited Partner's
10
    Interest as a Limited Partner for which the
11
    information is sought .... Despite anything to the
12
    contrary in this Agreement or in the Act, Limited
13
    Partners will not be entitled to inspect or receive
14
    copies of the following ... (c), trade secrets of the
15
    Partnership or the General Partner, investor
16
    information, financial statements of Limited Partners
17
    or similar materials, documents and correspondence."
18
                    This language appears in Section
19
    12.2.1 of the 2009, 2013, and 2016 partnership
20
    agreements at JX 2, 5 and 8. The reference to Section
21
    12.1 refers to the agreements' section on books and
22
    records, which reads as follows:
23
                     "Books and records of the Partnership
24
    will be maintained at the principal office of the
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- 1 Partnership or at whatever other office of the
- 2 | Partnership as may be designated by the General
- 3 Partner, and will be available for examination by any
- 4 Partner or that Partner's duly authorized
- 5 | representatives at any reasonable time. The
- 6 Partnership will maintain the following books and
- 7 records.
- 8 "12.1.1. A current list of the full
- 9 | name and last known business or residence address of
- 10 each Partner, together with the Capital Contributions
- 11 and Partnership Percentage of each of those Partners;
- 12 | 12.1.3. Copies of the Partnership's federal, state
- 13 and local income tax or information returns and
- 14 reports, if any, for the six most recent taxable
- 15 vears."
- Those background facts set the table
- 17 | for the parties' books and records dispute. On
- 18 | January 10, 2018, plaintiffs served the general
- 19 partner with a demand pursuant to Section 17-305 and
- 20 the partnership agreement for the inspection of
- 21 | certain books and records of the partnerships. I will
- 22 | call this the "Demand Letter."
- The Demand Letter listed two purposes.
- 24 | The first was valuing plaintiffs' interests in the

partnerships. This was related to losses in certain tax years, and plaintiffs claimed to want "to determine whether and to what extent the Trusts' interest should be sold, assigned, exchanged or otherwise transferred."

Second, they sought to analyze the ownership structures of each of the partnerships because they had recently learned of what they called "an unexplained diminution of their respective ownership interests in entities that invest in various funds managed by Greylock Partners."

In short, the Trusts' ownership percentage was higher the earlier the partnership was formed. For example, the Trusts held a 7.35 percent interest in a company formed in 2000, but only about 1.1 percent for companies formed in 2009 and 2013.

The plaintiffs sought documentation

"to explain this diminution, and to determine whether certain other Corning or Murfey family trusts have been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Trusts."

After the general partner's counsel responded to the Demand Letter, plaintiffs and the general partner entered into a confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement governing the inspection of

books and records, or the "Confidentiality Agreement,"
on April 13, 2018, which is in the record as JX 32.

Pursuant to the Confidentiality

Agreement, the general partner agreed to make certain information and documents available for inspection in response to the Demand Letter. This production sufficiently addressed nearly all of plaintiffs' requests. The current dispute centers on one narrow set of documents that was not produced: the K-1s of other limited partners.

On July 31, 2008, Richard Szekelyi of Phoenix Management Services, on behalf of plaintiffs, conducted an in-person inspection of certain of the partnerships' books and records at the office of the general partner in Cleveland, Ohio. During the inspection, the K-1s were made available to Mr. Szekelyi to review with Mr. Nordell but not copy. Mr. Szekelyi was not permitted to make or retain copies of the K-1s.

Defendants subsequently agreed to make copies of the K-1s available to Mr. Szekelyi and to plaintiffs' counsel on the condition that the K-1s would be produced under a professionals'-eyes-only designation. Plaintiffs reserved their right to

- 1 pursue greater access to the documents.
- The parties' dispute culminated in
- 3 this action when, on September 4, 2018, plaintiffs
- 4 | filed the verified complaint. On November 19, 2018,
- 5 | plaintiffs executed Amendment No. 1 to the
- 6 | Confidentiality Agreement, which allowed plaintiffs'
- 7 | counsel and Mr. Szekelyi to obtain and possess copies
- 8 of the K-1 forms on certain terms and conditions.
- 9 That is JX 33. Subsequently, plaintiffs' counsel and
- 10 Mr. Szekelyi executed undertakings in connection with
- 11 Amendment No. 1 and received copies of the K-1 forms
- 12 from defendants.
- I held trial on February 6, 2019, and
- 14 | the parties filed a joint schedule of evidence on
- 15 March 20, 2019.
- The remaining issues are whether
- 17 | plaintiffs may obtain copies of the K-1 forms and
- 18 | whether plaintiffs' advisors can consult with
- 19 | plaintiffs concerning information in the K-1s. In
- 20 | short, I conclude that plaintiffs have no right to the
- 21 K-1s or the information they contain.
- 22 In Madison Avenue Investment Partners
- 23 | versus American First Real Estate Investment Partners,
- 24 | this Court stated that a limited partner must meet

three requirements to prevail on a books and records

demand. The first two are laid out in Section

17-305(e). The demand must follow the form and manner

of making demand. This is not an issue in this case.

Next, the demand must be reasonable and for a purpose reasonably related to the limited partner's interest as a limited partner. This requirement includes two components for the purposes the plaintiffs advance here. The party requesting records must show the documents are "necessary and essential" to accomplishing that purpose.

And to investigate potential wrongdoing, the party requesting the books and records must show "a credible basis from which the Court can infer that mismanagement, waste or wrongdoing may have occurred." That's from Seinfeld versus Verizon Communications.

These requirements are where all the action is in this case.

Finally, the inspection right is subject to such reasonable standards "as may be set forth in the partnership agreement or otherwise established by the general partners." That last part is a quote from Section 17-305(a). This is also not

an issue here because the parties provided no standards established by the general partner that pertain to the analysis here.

First, turning to proper purpose. The partnership agreements include language similar to the language of 17-305, allowing the limited partner to request certain information "for purposes reasonably related to the Limited Partner's interest."

As summarized from their Demand

Letter, plaintiffs assert two purposes. The first is

valuing their shares. They asked for a number of

documents, including documents already turned over,

like the partnership tax returns, the Trusts' Schedule

K-1s, and annual valuations.

The second purpose is investigating the propriety of the plaintiffs' respective ownership interests in the partnerships. Plaintiffs claim they will be able to understand who benefited from the diminution of their interests, and in what amounts, if they receive the K-1s.

I must focus on plaintiffs' primary purpose, and I can discount any secondary purposes under Norfolk City Retirement Systems versus Jos. A. Bank.

On the record before me, I cannot conclude their primary purpose is something other than valuing their shares or investigating the alleged wrongful dilution. Those are proper purposes under our law.

It is tempting to look only at the narrow nature of the remaining dispute and conclude that plaintiffs do not have a proper purpose for requesting copies of the K-1s, which is what defendants argue I should do. But the plaintiffs requested other documents as well, and those documents, which defendants provided, fit more neatly within the stated purposes. With that context and viewing the request as a whole, in the absence of evidence showing an improper actual purpose, I conclude that plaintiffs have stated proper purposes of valuing their shares and investigating wrongdoing.

I will next focus on plaintiffs'

desire to investigate potential wrongdoing. As stated earlier from our Supreme Court's Seinfeld decision, to prove that the stated purpose is justified, the stockholder must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, "a credible basis from which the court can infer that mismanagement, waste or wrongdoing may

1 have occurred."

The "credible basis" standard is the lowest burden of proof known in our law. It only requires that the plaintiff present "some evidence" of wrongdoing. Even with this low standard, however, plaintiffs fail to satisfy their burden.

The plaintiffs allege the following:

"The Murfeys received no notice of the admission of the new limited partners, and only once received an offer to increase investments in WHC 2009 (in 2011). If the Murfeys had been provided further opportunities to increase the Trusts' investments, they would have done so." Citing the Spencer deposition at JX 30. "Indeed, the Trusts were subject to the Murfeys' standing orders to increase any Greylock holdings whenever possible. For reasons unknown to the Murfeys, their directions were not followed. Plaintiffs are entitled to investigate why they were not treated equally to their fellow limited partners."

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing in the admission of new limited partners. At trial, at page 128 of the transcript, plaintiffs' counsel stated, "it

was done in a way to not affect the ownership
interests of the Murfeys."

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And Section 2.3.2 of the partnership agreements provide multiple means of admitting new limited partners. Plaintiffs have given me no standards or evidence from which to infer that the proper ways of adding new limited partners were ignored, that plaintiffs had a right to receive notice that was violated, or that any other obligation or standard of conduct was breached when the new limited partners were admitted.

Plaintiffs have also failed to establish a credible basis for suspecting wrongdoing in the context of missing an opportunity to increase investments in the WHC 2009 partnership. The only evidence of decreased ownership in the record relates to the 2011 opportunity.

First, plaintiffs' theory depends on an assumption that they have a right to own the same percentage in every investment vehicle and that something suspect has occurred because the amount they own in successive entities has decreased.

Plaintiffs assert they seek to remediate such wrongdoing by suing fellow limited

partners who have increased their percentages of ownership under a theory of unjust enrichment, but that they need the identities of the other limited partners to do so in order to avoid suing their mother or sister.

Plaintiffs have shown nothing that guarantees them the right to equal shares that they claim, and so there is no credible basis to suspect wrongdoing.

Second, plaintiffs seek to learn why their standing orders to invest at every opportunity were not followed. To establish a credible basis to investigate wrongdoing within the partnerships, they would have to establish a credible basis to conclude they have a right to receive opportunities to invest to avoid dilution in the partnerships, and that such requisite offers to invest were not made. The unrebutted record evidence clearly shows what happened on that point: the offer was made, but plaintiffs' then-trustees declined.

Nordell testified that Greylock first approached the 2009 partnership in 2011 about a \$12 million investment opportunity. That's at JX 29, page 35, line 21, to page 40, line 14. Some of the

limited partners, including the Murfeys, committed to that opportunity. Greylock came back with a second \$12 million opportunity, and although other limited partners participated in that second opportunity, the Murfeys trustees did not. That explains the one-time drop in ownership in 2011 for the 2009 partnership.

Plaintiffs provide no evidence to rebut this testimony, introduce no other theory, and draw no other conclusion. Based on this failure alone, they have failed to show a credible basis for investigating other theories for the diminution in their shares within the partnership.

The record provides an even more detailed explanation. Defendants provided a 2011 email chain between the then-trustees, Mr. Chisholm and Ms. Muth, discussing the second opportunity. Those co-trustees knew about the opportunity and deciding against investing more. This is confirmed in a 2018 email Mr. Chisholm sent to plaintiff's counsel, where Chisholm says that it was "beneficiaries and trustees" that "decided not to increase the commitment by an additional \$165,000 for a variety of reasons." Those are JXs 87 and 88.

Plaintiffs challenge the admission of

JXs 87 and 88 on relevance and hearsay grounds. These are the only documents subject to objections that I am relying on in this opinion, and so will be the only objections I address. The documents are clearly relevant because they relate to the supposed credible basis for suspecting wrongdoing.

Plaintiffs must show a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing related to the drop in their percentage. Both documents go directly to the point and explain why the decreased percentages were not the result of wrongdoing by the partnership or general partner.

Second, as to hearsay, plaintiffs complain that Chisholm was not deposed and did not appear at trial to be subject to cross-examination. Plaintiffs miss that Chisholm is not a stranger. At all relevant times he has been a trustee of the trusts on behalf of which plaintiffs purportedly brought this action. His statements are thus not hearsay under Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), as Chisholm was the Trusts' agent, the statement is within the scope of his relationship and responsibilities as Trustee, and the statements were made while he held the role of Trustee.

The documents only further confirm other unrebutted evidence about why the Trusts' ownership decreased in 2011.

Plaintiffs have not shown a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing in their missed opportunity to invest for any reason other than their trustees declining the opportunity.

I recognize that the credible basis standard is incredibly low, but in this case, the record contains an unrebutted admission by plaintiffs' then-trustees that they knew about the offer and decided against it. The record does not establish any basis for suspecting wrongdoing within the partnership in the form of improper admission of new partners, not maintaining equal participation, or in not being informed of the opportunity to invest.

I will now move on to whether plaintiffs' ability to copy the K-1s is necessary and essential for the purpose plaintiffs have demonstrated, of valuing their shares.

"Even if the applicable technical requirements are met and [a plaintiff's] purpose is proper, '[t]he scope of such relief will typically be limited only to the inspection of those books and

records that are necessary and essential to the satisfaction of the stated purpose.'" That is a quote from Holman versus Northwest Broadcasting.

It is helpful to remember that plaintiffs have already received other documents from defendants, and plaintiffs' CPA has reviewed the K-1s with Mr. Nordell. The narrow issue before the Court is only whether the plaintiffs themselves may receive and keep copies of the K-1s.

Based on my review of the plaintiffs'
K-1s that are in evidence, I conclude that doing so is
not necessary and essential to satisfying the stated
valuation purposes. I see no type of information on
the K-1s that would help the plaintiffs value their
investments. And I do not see how the percentages of
the other limited partners, with identifiers, are
necessary and essential to value plaintiffs'
investments.

I twice asked about this at trial, in the transcript at page 14, lines 12 through 16 and at page 17, lines 17 through 20, and neither time was I pointed to information that would assist plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs assert another concept under the umbrella of their valuation purpose:

identifying the other partners so that they can

determine the ease of selling their shares. The

strained theory of selling their shares is

contradicted by their desire to invest as much as

possible, which is the sentiment underlying their

angst at missing the second investment opportunity

that underlies this entire case.

And holding copies of the K-1s would not help plaintiffs in determining the liquidity of their shares. These are family investment vehicles. And at argument, page 20 of the transcript, plaintiffs' counsel identified three individuals who "control a majority of the interest in the partnership." In other words, to the extent knowing who controls the general partnership informs their ability to sell their shares, plaintiffs already know that information, so the K-1s are not necessary and essential to that analysis.

Because the K-1s do not include information that will assist in valuing the shares, they are not necessary and essential to that purpose.

Finally, the parties devoted significant time to Sections 12.1 and 12.2 of the partnership agreements. Defendants correctly point

out that plaintiffs' complaint does not pursue 1 2 separate claims under the statute and the partnership 3 agreements. I think that is too technical a reading, 4 however, because plaintiffs' demand letters referenced the partnership agreements, JX 10 and 12, as did 5 6 defendants' response to those letters, JX 11 and 13. 7 "This Court consistently has treated a 8 contractual books and records right provided in a limited liability company's ("LLC") or a limited 9 10 partnership's ("LP") governing instrument as 11 independent from the relevant default statutory 12 right." That is a quote from Grand Acquisition versus 1.3 Passco. 14 The operative sections, quoted 15 earlier, cover which books and records must be kept 16 and made available for inspection. Plaintiffs' 17 post-trial brief describes Sections 12.1.1 and 12.1.3 18 as tracking "Delaware law regarding the documents that 19 a successful books and records plaintiff is entitled 20 to obtain." And 12.2.1 uses language similar to the 21 statute: "purposes reasonably related to the Limited 2.2 Partner's Interest as a Limited Partner." 23 At least as far as the K-1s are 24 concerned, the proper purpose requirement of the

partnership agreements and Section 305 is thus the This is not a case like In re Paine Webber or Schwartzberg v. CRITEF, where the agreements omitted a proper purpose requirement. These cases demonstrate that, again quoting from Grand Acquisition v. Passco, "this Court has indicated that providing an entity's owners with an unconditional contractual right to inspect that entity's books and records has the practical impact of rendering the relevant statutory preconditions and defenses inapplicable to that independent contractual right."

Plaintiffs have not argued that they have an unconditional contractual right to inspect the partnership's documents. What they have argued is that upon establishing a proper purpose, all of the books and records -- not some, but all -- identified in Section 12.1 must be provided to the limited partner.

In other words, once they show a proper purpose, they do not need to show the requested books and records are necessary and essential to their purpose.

But Section 12.2.1 permits each
limited partner to obtain the information in Section

1 12.1 "for purposes reasonably related to the Limited
2 Partner's Interest." The simple word "for" links the
3 right to obtain the information in Section 12.1 to the
4 limited partner's proper purpose in the very same way
5 Section 17-305 does.

2.2

The LLC agreement in DFG Wine Co.

versus Eight Estates Wine Holdings used this same

language, and the Court applied Section 18-305's

"necessary and essential" language to consider whether

the member was entitled to the documents sought among

those the company was required to maintain.

applying the proper purpose requirement without the "necessary and essential" element. Section 12.2.1 incorporates the proper purpose requirement from Section 17-305, thereby incorporating the derivative requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate the materials in Section 12.1 are necessary and essential to their valuation purpose.

Plaintiffs' claims thus fail under the contractual provisions for the same reasons that they fail under Section 17-305.

One prior ruling is affected by this conclusion. On April 24, I ruled that the information

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    from the K-1s that were the subject of the disputed
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    request could remain confidential in the parties
 3
    briefing and filings until a final ruling. Because I
 4
    have ruled in defendants favor, those portions should
 5
    remain under seal.
 6
                     Counsel, are there any questions?
 7
                    MR. NEFF: No, Your Honor.
 8
                    MR. DICAMILLO: No, Your Honor.
 9
                     THE COURT: Will you take care of
10
    submitting an implementing order?
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                    MR. DICAMILLO: I'll take care of it,
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                 Have a good weekend.
    Your Honor.
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                     THE COURT: You too.
                                Thank you, Your Honor.
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                    MR. NEFF:
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                    (Conference adjourned at 4:20 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

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3 I, JEANNE CAHILL, RDR, CRR, Official 4 Court Reporter for the Court of Chancery of the State 5 of Delaware, do hereby certify that the foregoing 6 pages numbered 3 through 26 contain a true and correct 7 transcription of the proceedings as stenographically 8 reported by me at the hearing in the above cause 9 before the Vice Chancellor of the State of Delaware, 10 on the date therein indicated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand at Wilmington, Delaware, this 24th day of June, 2019.

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/s/ Jeanne Cahill

Jeanne Cahill, RDR, CRR
Official Chancery Court Reporter
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter

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